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1. Introduction 
 
We often study the incidence of taxation, and the significant question is how the tax 
affects the taxable or how the tax distorts the market. Nevertheless, to understand the 
effectiveness of taxation, we should also focus on where the tax money is spent.  
Therefore, we should give the same importance to subsidies and allowances. A sound 
housing allowance system is described as effective and efficient, meaning the 
incidence of the allowance is where it is supposed to be, and it is organized cost-
efficiently (Antikainen et al. 2017). This paper researches the question of incidence: 
Does housing allowances raise rents? I look at the question from two aspects: Do 
housing allowance recipients pay higher rent and do housing allowance increase 
overall rents.  
 
The social insurance institution of Finland (KELA) paid benefits for almost 14,9 billion 
euros in 2018. Direct housing allowances were given over 2,1 billion euros that year. 
(KELA 2019A). Housing allowance (from this point forward HA) plays a remarkable 
role in Finnish society. At the end of 2018, it was allowed for 850 000 recipients, which 
means that over 15% of the Finnish population earned HA (KELA 2019B). With such 
a remarkable impact on Finnish housing, it is essential to understand if the HA system 
fulfills its’ purpose. HA is a part of the Finnish housing policy. The primary purpose of 
HA is to ensure an adequate standard of housing and release housing costs for other 
consumption for low-income citizens (Jauhiainen et al. 2019).  
 
The research on this subject is relatively small. This paper focuses majorly on 
econometric studies conducted in Finland about the Finnish rental market and HA 
scheme. The main sources are by Kangasharju, A. (2003) “maksaako asumistuen 
saaja muita korkeampaa vuokraa?”. A study made for the Finnish Government Institute 
for Economic Research (VATT). I also use a later study by Kangasharju (2010): 
“Housing Allowance and the Rent of Low-income Households" published in 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. In addition to these, I use Virén M. (2013): “Is the 
housing allowance shifted to rental prices?”  for Empirical Economics and finally, I 
utilize the work by Eerola, E. and Lyytikäinen, T. (2019): "Housing allowance and rents: 
Evidence from a stepwise subsidy scheme", for VATT.   
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Kangasharju (2003) finds the housing allowance recipients to pay 11,5–12,2% higher 
rent, and later Kangasharju (2010) states that one additional euro of HA leads to 60–
70 cents higher rent for the recipient. Virén (2013) results in one-third of HA to shift 
into overall rent prices. The latest results from Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) suggest 
that HA recipients do not pay remarkably higher rents than non-recipients. International 
studies' results are as contradictive.  
 
The results depend highly on the methods, models, and assumptions used in the 
research. The simultaneous causality of HA and rents make the research question 
challenging to study and leads the researchers to sophisticated statistical methods. 
The results should be interpreted cautiously.  I conclude in this paper that Eerola & 
Lyytikäinen (2019) provide the best empirical methods, setting, modeling, and 
robustness. Also, their results are converging with some recent foreign studies (Brewer 
et al. 2019; Eriksen & Ross, 2015). Consequently, I argue that HA recipients do not 
pay remarkably higher rents. 
 
For the question of overall rent prices and housing allowance, I conclude that we do 
not have enough evidence to point out the size of the impact. The impact is most likely 
positive, as theory and current evidence suggest (Susin 2002. Virén 2013 et cetera), 
but the HA scheme is only a part of the rental market and therefore, might have 
insignificant or little impact on rent prices. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. After the introduction, I present the institutional 
background for Finnish studies. Starting from the Finnish rental market and then 
proceeding to explain the Finnish HA scheme. The third chapter addresses from a 
theoretical point of view why HA would increase rents. The fourth chapter first 
introduces international studies and then focuses on Finnish studies and explains their 
results. After this, I conclude the paper. 
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2. Finnish rental market and Housing allowance scheme 
2.1 Finnish rental market 
 
This paper studies demand-side subsidies. One must note that in Finland and most 
developed countries, the government provides housing support for the supply side. A 
major part of Finnish rental housing is supplied by ARA, the Housing Finance and 
Development Centre of Finland. ARA implements the social housing policy. 
Approximately one million apartments have been build using ARA construction since 
its founding in 1949. In 2016 878 000 households lived in rental dwellings, of which 
317 000 were ARA dwellings (tilastokeskus 2017). The rent is based on the actual 
costs of construction and maintenance and is not based on market factors. It is 
necessary to keep in mind that ARA dwellings do affect the Finnish housing market 
since they are cheaper than their market counterparts. Due to the complicated nature 
of the subject, I only look at the demand-side of the housing support, yet one must 
keep in mind the supply-side factors. 
 
Characteristics of Finnish housing trends are living alone, urbanization, and living 
downtown. According to Terämä et al. (2018), over a million persons live alone. 
Persons living alone often have a more difficult financial situation, and housing costs 
per tenant is higher. Therefore, they are the biggest group earning a housing allowance 
(See figure 2.). The development of living alone is similar to other Nordic countries 
(Terämä et al. 2018). Urbanization and living downtown often focus on areas that are 
inelastic in supply (Oikarinen, Peltola, Valtonen 2014), which causes the prices to rise. 
In some areas, Finnish housing market pricing is above the perfect competition 
equilibrium because the supply of housing cannot respond to the high demand. In the 
chapter, 3 I look how HA would response to inelastic supply. 
 
In Finland, the private sector has no restriction on rental prices, although unreasonable 
price rises in inhabited dwellings are restricted. The rental pricing is negotiated 
between tenant and the property owner, although they often use third-party services 
to find each other. The Finnish law does not allow discriminating prices between 
tenants based on their characteristics. The yearly price changes in the rental price are 
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often attached to the cost-of-living index. Figure 1. shows the development of indexed 
rent prices, consumer prices, and housing allowance. Helsinki indicates the Greater 
Helsinki area. Government-subsidised means ARA-housing. The rental housing prices 
have increased substantially more than the consumer price index. Also, the figure 
shows how the Greater Helsinki area has encountered higher price rises than other 
areas. 
 
 
2.2 Housing allowance scheme 
 
To understand and analyze the economic effects of housing allowance, we need to 
state the main reason why these are paid and then analyze is the goal achieved from 
the economic point of view.  Having an apartment is often thought of as a human right. 
As UN's declaration of universal human rights states: 
 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
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care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” 
 
With this being said, one goal of HAs is to provide a standard level of housing for low-
income people (Jauhiainen et al. 2019). The other goal is to shift the money used in 
the housing to other consumption, which increases the welfare of the recipient 
(Soininvaara, 2018). Hence, the goal of HA is to increase the wellbeing of the 
recipients. Not the property owners’ wellbeing. Also, as a part of the Finnish housing 
policy, HA has other social purposes, such as reducing segregation. 
 
Different types of HAs are paid by KELA, depending on the characteristics of the 
recipient. Most notable of HAs is the general housing allowance, which has grown 
rapidly in the past twenty years (see figure 2). Other HA types are housing allowance 
for pensioners, Housing supplement for students, and housing assistance for 
conscripts’ families. On top of these, we can consider income support as a part of the 
housing allowance, since HA is not 100% of the housing price. With the aid of income 
support, one can have their whole rent paid by the public sector. 
 
Figure 2. shows the development of HA recipients in the 2000s. As one can see, the 
most significant demographic group of HA recipients are those who live alone. In the 
past two decades, the Finnish population has moved into solo and couple housing 
more. Solo housing has grown 1-3% yearly (Tilastokeskus 2018C). Most of the general 
HA recipients are aged 15-29. The spike in the figure in the year 2017 is mostly 
because students were shifted from the ‘housing support to students’ to the general 
housing allowance. According to Soininvaara O. (2018), HAs paid have doubled since 
2006 because a significant portion of the "baby boomers" has reached pension age, 
high unemployment, and structural changes in the HA system in 2015. 
 
Receiving HA is mostly a momentary situation in one’s life. Figure 3 show the portion 
of HA recipients staying and exiting the system during years 2013 to 2017. Pensioners 
seem to earn HA for the longest periods and students tend to exit quickly. 
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Figure 3. The portion of HA recipients earning HA during 2013–2017 
Source: KELA (2018) 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
450000
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
re
ci
p
ie
n
ts
Figure 2. Household type of general housing 
allowance recipients
Living alone
Childless couples, Two parent families, One parent families and others
total Source: Tilastokeskus (2018C) 
  9 
The Finnish literature on this subject and the ones used as a reference in this paper 
covers data from the years 1990 to 2013. The studies focus on general HA. During this 
period, general HA was determined by rent per square meter, floor area of the dwelling, 
construction, or major renovation year, and location of the building. In addition to those, 
tenant characteristics would determine the general HA with variables as pre-tax 
Income and household size. As we later learn, Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) ingeniously 
exploit the stepwise nature of the HA generosity and floor area variable.  
 
In 2015 the general HA faced a major renovation. The system was simplified, and the 
HA is determined by housing costs (rent, water, heating, and electricity), the number 
of adults and children, and their monthly income and municipality of the dwelling. A 
maximum of 80% of the accepted rental costs is paid. For example, in 2019, the highest 
accepted rental cost is 516 euros in Helsinki 80 percent of it would be paid as a HA 
giving the tenant benefit of 412,8 euros. The system now allows tenants to choose 
their housing more freely, without the characteristics of the house affecting their HA.  
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3. Theory of housing allowances affecting rental prices 
 
To understand the research question, 'Does housing allowance raise rents?', the effect 
should be understood from the theoretical point of view. This section focuses on 
explaining why the HA would raise rents and, on the other hand, what could limit the 
impact. 
 
Starting from the simplest model of demand and supply, we can think of HA as an 
income increase for low-income recipients. In that case, income increase should shift 
the demand curve of the recipients rightwards. Assuming that the income elasticity of 
rental housing demand is positive, this will cause the consumption of housing to be 
higher, and the price should rise, depending on the elasticity of supply. This model is 
similar to Susin (2002). 
 
 
Figure 4. shows how HA affects the recipients. Note that this does not show the whole 
market reaction. The new equilibrium is spot Q*.  The HA recipients should increase 
their housing consumption, but some of it could lead to price raises, which, on the other 
hand, would increase the income of landlords. This common problem where the legal 
object does not necessarily face the full effect of the intervention can be seen in many 
P1 
P
2 
 
Q1 
  
Q* 
  
Quantity 
Price 
Figure 4. A shift in demand caused by increased 
income or housing allowance 
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different situations, where the government intervenes in markets — for example, the 
incidence of taxation.  
 
In this model, the effect of HA on price depends on 1, income elasticity of rental housing 
demand, which is not a problem since one purpose of the HA is to increase the housing 
consumption of low-income people. And, the effect also depends on 2,  the price 
elasticity of supply of rental houses. The price elasticity of supply can be seen inelastic 
in the short run or even in the long run, especially in big cities (see Oikarinen, Peltola, 
Valtonen 2014). 
 
If this theoretical point of view indeed is valid, it still does not necessarily mean price 
raises in the overall rental housing market. The weight of HA recipients in the whole 
market might be small enough not to create price raises for those who do not earn HA. 
If so, we need to think of two separate effects of HA on rental pricing: Does the HA 
raise prices for the HA recipients only, or does it also affect those who do not earn HA? 
In other words, affect the market overall? If the competition were perfect, the rent for 
HA recipients would be the same as for non-recipients. Some studies focus on the 
question if the ‘law of one price’ applies. If it does not, then HA recipients and non-
recipients could face different prices on rental dwellings. As Kangasharju (2003 & 
2010) studies, there could be one market for HA recipients and one for non-recipients, 
if HA recipients pay a higher price for the same dwelling. On the other hand, Virén 
(2013) concludes that the Finnish rental market has "one price", mostly because the 
law forbids discrimination, and landlords are not able to know the source of their 
tenant's income.  
 
Yet another problem with this model is that it does not consider differences in 
institutional systems. If we think that HA pays the whole rent in full, let us say up to 
1000 euros. Then the recipients would have the incentive to have a dwelling, which 
costs 1000 euros. This could rather straightforwardly raise prices since there would be 
no point in renting an apartment for a lesser cost. Soininvaara (2018) argues that this 
type of case is with income support, as it pays 100% of the rent and allows no incentive 
to reduce rental costs. However, Eerola, Lyytikäinen, Saarimaa & Öberg (2019) find 
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that income support does not create a lower limit to rents and that income support 
recipients may increase their rents, although it might be through a higher quality of 
housing.  
 
Gladly, in most situations, the rent is not paid fully.  Most HA systems pay recipients 
less than the cost of the rent for the tenant. The Finnish general HA gives a maximum 
of 80% of the rental costs for the tenant. There is also a limitation on the highest 
possible amount given. As mentioned earlier, in Helsinki for a person living alone, that 
would be 80% of 516 euros.  It is almost impossible to find a cheaper rental in Helsinki. 
This means that almost everyone living alone pays more for the housing than the 
maximum allowed rent is. Every additional euro has to be fully paid by the tenant, 
meaning the marginal price for higher quality housing is the same for HA recipients 
and non-recipients, which means they should have similar behavior in the rental 
market. If the HA system would pay some percentage of the total rent, let us say 70% 
of the rent, the recipient would have the incentive to increase spending on housing 
since they would only pay 30% of the price increase. This system could raise prices. 
From a theoretical point of view, the current system seems to have the least reason to 
raise rental prices, as rental housing is already more expensive than the given HA. 
 
If the HA system takes the characteristics of the dwelling into account, it should 
increase HA recipients’ demand for those dwellings, that optimize the amount of HA. 
As Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) state, in competitive equilibrium, this could cause 
higher rents for eligible units, if the amount of HA recipients is relatively large. There 
could also be a possibility that HA recipients would move to eligible rentals, leaving 
unsuitable rentals for non-recipients. The overall effect could leave rent prices the 
same. 
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4. Conducted studies on housing allowance effects on rents 
 
Most times, the effects of HA and rental prices are studied by natural experiments. 
Studying the effects is challenging from an econometric point of view. The causality of 
rents and HA might go both ways. Rents increase HA, but researchers try to focus on 
the question does the HA increase rents. This simultaneous dependency makes typical 
OLS regression difficult to conduct. The researcher needs to select carefully 
independent variables to make sure they do not correlate with each other. Finding all 
the relevant explanatory variables is difficult, and the researcher might easily fall into 
omitted-variable bias as rent prices are determined by multiple factors, of which some 
also explain the HA. They often try to solve the problem with instrument variables or 
fixed effects regression. 
 
One effective way to study the effects of HA on rent is to utilize the system attributes, 
which makes the HA to react independently of rent changes as Eerola & Lyytikäinen 
(2019) do with the stepwise nature of the general HA. Another option is to focus on 
changes in the system with differences in differences method as Kangasharju (2010) 
does. Either way, the results can vary a lot, since the methods, approach, assumptions, 
and used variables differ a lot. There is no unanimous view among researchers which 
econometric method would be best for research of HA and rents. 
 
4.1 Foreign studies  
 
In this section, I will focus on some of the most relevant international studies about the 
causality of HA and rents. The subject is studied in a few developed countries, although 
the overall number of scientific researches, in this case, is not that wide. Most of them 
answer to the question if HA recipients pay higher rents than non-recipients or increase 
their rental expenditure after increases in HA. The institutional setting in each country 
differs, meaning that the findings in a particular country cannot be interpreted to be 
fully valid in another country. Still, the results of foreign countries can give us valuable 
knowledge of the rent effect and HA, which helps us to understand the results of 
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Finnish studies. As the results below tell, the HA seems to have a positive effect on 
rent. The size of the impact is often contradicting.  
 
Laferrère & Le Blanc (2004) studies if the rent of HA recipients rises faster than non-
recipients in France. They study the impact using reform in 1992-1994, which allowed 
the HA for households whom it was not granted before. Laferrère & Le Blanc (2004) 
find that the recipient's rent increases faster than non-recipients. Their analysis 
focuses on the short-term effect of the reform, and either does not answer the question 
of overall rent levels. Another French study is by Fack (2006), which uses the same 
reform as Laferrère & Le Blanc. Fack (2006) also studies the impact on new recipients 
and finds that one euro of HA increases 50-80 cents in rents. Fack reasons this to be 
caused by low elasticity of supply. 
 
In the United Kingdom, Gibbons & Manning (2006) studies the effect of HA reforms in 
1996 and 1997. In the British system, the HA (Housing Benefit) could pay 100% of the 
rent. The reform lowered the maximum payable HA for new tenants applying for HA. 
The older HA recipients’ allowance was not reduced. Gibbons & Manning (2006) find 
that the housing benefit reduces around 10-15%, and rents reduce 6-11%. This could 
mean that around 2/3 of the HA reduction is paid by the landlords, meaning the majority 
of the HA profits landlords rather than recipients. 
 
Brewer, Browne, Emmerson, Hood & Joyce (2019) responds to Gibbons & Manning's 
(2006) study with newer data from 2011-2012 housing benefit reform, where the UK 
government reduced the generosity of the housing benefit. Brewer et al. (2019) find 
that, on average, around 90% of HA reduction was paid by the tenants. They find that 
there is remarkable heterogeneity in the incidence amongst households. Those with 
relatively high HA for their needs had higher drops in their rents. Brewer et al. (2019) 
reason that this could be caused by more elastic demand when the consumption goes 
towards more ‘luxurious’ housing. They find that families living in 5-bedroom 
apartments, and single adults tend to downgrade housing after the reform. This way, 
the study helps understand Gibbons & Manning's (2006) results because Gibbons & 
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Manning (2006) focuses more on the cuts on the highest level of rents, which causes 
their results to be contradicting with Brewer et al. (2019).  
 
Hyslop & Rea (2019) study the effect of HA in Auckland, New Zealand. New Zealand's 
HA (Accommodation Supplement, AS) had a policy change in 2005. The policy 
changes divided Auckland into two different zones. Zone 1 & Zone 2. Zone 1 consists 
of the more expensive urban and downtown areas of Auckland and Zone 2 of outer 
Auckland. This caused the maximum HA to rise 28-45% in the zone 1, depending on 
the characteristics of the tenants and the dwelling. Hyslop & Rea (2019) study the 
effects of the policy change effects on rents using regression adjusted difference-in-
differences methods. They calculate the differences in boundary areas around the 
zone borders.  They find that, on average, the HA was $6,81 (NZD) per week higher 
inside zone 1 boundary than outside.  Their regression shows that this caused the 
inner zone recipients to pay $2,44 (NZD) higher rent per week. Hyslop & Rea (2019) 
are not able to explain if the recipients upgraded their housing quality or the landlord's 
raised the rental levels. 
 
Susin (2003) studies the effect of the US rent voucher system on overall rental prices. 
The theoretical background in Susin’s (2003) study reminds the supply-demand 
framework, as in figure 4.  Susin expects the vouchers to shift the demand curve 
rightwards, causing higher demand and price. Susin (2003) Finds that the voucher 
program causes a 16 percent increase in overall rents, which means that those who 
do not earn the voucher, pay $8,2 billion (USD) more rent than they would have without 
the program.  This results that the benefit from the voucher system ($5,8 billion) is 
smaller than the negative effect of the price rise on low-income households.   
 
Eriksen & Ross (2015) responds to the earlier studies of the voucher system in the US 
rental market. Eriksen & Ross (2015) find contradicting results to Susin (2002), as they 
find that an increased number of vouchers does not increase the price of rentals. 
Eriksen & Ross argue that Susin’s (2002) results “may be biased due to unobserved 
determinants of rent that are correlated with the existing supply of vouchers (Olsen 
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2003).” (Eriksen & Ross, 2015, p. 155). They conclude that their results estimate the 
short-term effects of a particular voucher expansion rather than the long-term.  
 
In addition to Susin and Eriksen & Ross, Collinson & Ganong 2018) study the US 
voucher system. Their study focuses on two separate research designs. One is with 
raising the rent ceiling equally in all areas, and the other is raising the rent ceiling with 
higher quality areas and lowering it in lower quality areas. They find that the equal 
increase in the rent ceiling causes the voucher rents to rise by 46%, with no 
improvement in quality. In the other situation ( or as they call it "tilting the rent ceiling"), 
they find that voucher recipients tend to move safer and higher quality housing at zero 
net cost to the government. This implies how critical the design of the HA system is to 
the impact on rents.  
 
 
 
4.2.1. Finnish studies’ background and setting 
 
Here I explain the background and the setting of Finnish studies conducted on the 
subject. The subject is not very commonly studied in Finland, and the following papers 
represent the most important ones of the small literature conducted. The following 
papers approach the question of housing allowances and rents from different 
standpoints and methods. 
 
Kangasharju (2003) is the first one to approach the incidence of housing allowances 
from the econometric point of view in the Finnish rental market. The purpose of the 
paper in question is to find if tenants with HA pay higher rent than those without.  
Kangasharju (2003) argues two different situations. One that HA could cause two 
different prices in the rental market. If landlords knew which tenants had HA, landlords 
would be able to ask higher prices from the tenants, hence causing the different market 
for HA recipients. Kangasharju (2003) admits that this type of situation would be 
unlikely since the landlords are not able to estimate a tenant’s payment source. The 
second option is that tenants with HA tend to move to better dwellings because the HA 
system allows them to earn more HA in bigger or newer houses.  
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Kangasharju’s (2003) estimate works in the following way. The logarithmic rental price 
is the dependent variable, and independent variables are those which explain rent 
price. If disposable income, household characteristics, and the quality of the dwelling 
explain rental costs, then the HA dummy coefficient would not have a statistically 
significant estimate, and the recipients' housing costs would be explained similarly as 
non-recipients. A significant coefficient with negative value would mean that HA does 
allow recipients to consume as much housing as non-recipients. A positive coefficient 
would mean that HA recipients pay a higher price for the same rentals as non-
recipients. He uses multiple control variables such as income, household size, living 
area, construction, or renovating year et cetera.  
 
As for the model, Kangasharju (2003) expects HA not to alter the elasticity of demand, 
but to shift the demand curve of the recipients rightwards. This means that 
Kangasharju assumes all HA recipients to react homogeneously to changes in the HA 
amount.  
 
Kangasharju (2003) utilizes data gained from Statistics Finland (Tilastokeskus) during 
the years 1993-2000. The data is panel data from Income Distribution Statistics 
collected by random sampling. The sample consists of 15 607 observations. 
Kangasharju (2003) uses this data to generate three different estimations. First, with 
the ordinary least squares method (OLS), secondly, he uses the panel attribute of the 
data to run a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation, and thirdly Kangasharju (2003) 
estimates the data with instrumental variable regression.  
 
Kangasharju (2010) renews his research before with newer data and changes in the 
HA system in 2002. His research background mostly relies on the same institutional 
settings and model as Kangasharju (2003). This time Kangasharju (2010) expects the 
landlords to know which tenants have HA admitted. Kangasharju (2010) argues that in 
November 2006, 53% of HAs were paid directly to the landlords, and thus, the 
landlords know which tenants have HA. 
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Kangasharju (2010) uses data from households between the years 1994 and 2003. 
The study mainly focuses on HA program reform in 2002, where the rent ceilings 
increased, causing an increase in HA for recipients. Kangasharju (2010) first uses OLS 
regression for the data to estimate the effects of HA on rent during the years 1994-
2003. Later he focuses on the reform and estimates the data from 2000 to 2003 with 
Differences-in-differences estimation, then with Instrumental variables estimation. 
 
Virén (2013) studies the effect of HA on rents from a similar point of view as the 
theoretical model presented by Susin (2003). Virén uses panel data from KELA, which 
consists of 50 000 households. The effective number of observations is 140 000. The 
data consists only of households that received HA and therefore lacks a proper control 
group. Virén also uses data from income distribution statistics from the years 1989-
2008.  
 
Virén (2013) discards Kangasharju’s assumption of different prices within the market, 
depending on the participants’ income source.  Virén assumes the law of one price to 
be in effect. This means if the price paid by HA recipients rises, then the overall market 
price would rise. Virén creates a model in which rental price depends on several control 
variables. The key variable is the maximum HA coefficient. The estimation then tries 
to explain how much changes in maximum available HA affects the rental level. Virén 
also estimates if HA increases demand as in consumed living space 
 
Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) approach the question of HAs and rents from the Finnish 
general HA programs' characteristic point of view. They use data provided by KELA of 
HA recipients and their dwellings from 2008 to 2013. They argue that the stepwise 
nature of the general HA system could reveal to us the nature of the price raising effect. 
They use features of regression discontinuity design (RDD) to research the effect. 
They can quantify the effect with an IV regression using the discontinues as 
instruments.  The main argument is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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The figure shows the stepwise nature of the HA/m2. The dots are sample means by 
0,5m2 floor area bins, and the lines are second-order polynomials fitted for each 
interval. The vertical lines are the cut-off limits of the compensable rent per square 
meter. As the floor area increases, the given HA decreases in a stepwise manner. For 
example, in their sample, on average, a flat with a floor area of 25,5m2 has the 
compensable rent limit as less than 12 euros, as 26m2 has a limit of 12.8 euros. This 
means that the cut-off is around 0,8 euros.  Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) argue that if 
HA influences rents, the rent price should have a similar pattern. As the right figure 
shows, there are no such phenomena in the illustration.  
 
The HA cut-off can be seen exogenous; therefore, it can be used to identify the impact 
of HA. The method used to identify it is somewhat regression discontinuity design 
(RDD). To execute this, first, Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) visualizes the discontinues 
as in figure 4 above. Then they estimate the effect of each cutoff on HA and rent 
separately. After this, they use the discontinuities as exogenous instruments for HA, 
with instrumental variables regression.  
 
Figure 5. Panel A: Floor area & monthly HA/m2. Panel B: Floor area & monthly rent/m2. 
Source: Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) 
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4.2.2 findings  
 
The results are quite contradicting. Kangasharju (2003) finds that HA recipients pay 
11,5-12,2% higher rents than non-recipients. Later Kangasharju (2010) reports 
surprisingly big difference to his previous work, as he finds that one additional euro of 
HA leads to 60-70 cents higher rent. Virén’s (2013) conservative estimate is one-third 
of a shift to overall rent prices, although it could be up to 50%. Eerola & Lyytikäinen 
(2019) finds no clear evidence that differences in HA cause changes in market rents.  
 
All of these studies have, to some extent, different assumptions, models, and methods 
to estimate the effect. Virén (2013) and Kangasharju (2003 & 2010) contradict each 
other as Virén expects the law of one price to be in effect, and Kangasharju assumes 
HA recipients to pay higher rent than non-recipients. Virén (2013) argues that the law 
of one price holds as his estimate shows the same prices for HA recipients and non-
recipients. Virén (2013) also notes that Kangasharju (2010) data is dominated by 
outlier observations, causing the OLS estimation to show biased results. Figure 6. by 
Virén (2013) visualizes the argument of large outliers. 
 
Although, Kangasharju (2010) and Virén (2013) states that HA has a very high effect 
on rent prices, the mechanism is different and therefore is not in line with each other. 
Also, Hiekka & Virén (2008) argue that Kangasharju's (2003) results should be 
interpreted carefully as using instrumental variable regression is complicated, and his 
instrumental variables are somewhat inadequate1.  
                                                        
1 Kangasharju (2003) uses the age of the youngest child and household's financial situation development 
dummy as an instrumental variable. 
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Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) conducts a robustness analysis for their paper and 
Kangasharju (2010) in their online appendix. Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) try to repeat 
Kangasharju’s (2010) results with the same data. Eerola & lyytikäinen (2019) are not 
able to find the same programming code as Kangasharju (2010), but they follow the 
methods described in his paper. For unknown reasons, Eerola & lyytikäinen end up 
with a remarkably bigger estimation sample. Eerola & lyytikäinen finds the results of 
the estimation to not to be robust and are inconsistent with Kangasharju (2010), but 
consistent with their paper. Eerola & lyytikäinen (2019) also discuss on Virén (2013) 
on their online appendix. They argue that their robustness analysis shows that Virén’s 
control variables lead to biased results, and that the Akaike Information Criterion score 
does not support the IV regression with first-order polynomials2. Eerola & Lyytikäinen 
argue that their internal validity is higher. 
                                                        
2. Virén (2013) controls with first-order terms floor area and construction year. (Viren (2013) controls only the 
first-order terms floor area and construction year fitted over the whole support of the floor area and 
construction year distribution.)   
Figure 6. The effect of the reform in 2002 on rents in 
Kangasharju (2010) estimation sample 
Source: Virén (2013) 
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5. Conclusion & discussion 
 
This paper is a literature review of the most notable studies on housing allowance and 
its effects on rents. The paper focuses majorly on the Finnish rental market and 
housing allowance scheme. The primary sources conclude as follows. Kangasharju 
(2003) finds the housing allowance recipients to pay 11,5-12,2% higher rent, and later 
Kangasharju (2010) states that one additional euro of HA leads to 60—70 cents higher 
rent for the recipient. Virén (2013) results in one-third of HA to shift into overall rent 
prices. The latest results from Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) suggest that HA recipients 
do not pay remarkably higher rents than non-recipients. International studies' results 
are as contradictive. 
 
The incidence of housing allowance is a complicated phenomenon to study, which 
causes the results to depend considerably on the researcher's choices and 
assumptions. The simultaneous causality of rents and housing allowance causes the 
effect challenging to study from an econometric standpoint. This makes it essential to 
consider the results with caution. 
 
As for the conclusion of this paper, the latest results (Eerola & Lyytikäinen 2019) 
suggest that HA would not have as big of an impact on HA recipients’ rental price as 
earlier studies show. Some recent foreign studies also support this result (Brewer et 
al. 2019; Eriksen & Ross, 2015). The empirical methods, setting, modeling, and 
robustness in Eerola & Lyytikäinen (2019) remains the most credible of Finnish’ 
studies. Therefore, I argue that with current knowledge, housing allowance recipients 
do not pay remarkably higher rent than non-recipients in Finland. 
 
I also argue that the price effect on the overall rent price is not studied well enough to 
draw specific conclusions. Most likely, as theory and some evidence suggest (Susin 
2002. Virén 2013. et cetera), HA increases the overall price as it increases demand in 
the rental market. The effect might be small as HA is a relatively small part of the entire 
market. Nevertheless, there is no enough empirical evidence provided to conclude the 
size of the impact. 
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As for now, HA seems to succeed in its' purpose. It increases housing consumption for 
low-income citizens and allows them to spend more on other consumption. Also, the 
housing allowance has other purposes, such as preventing segregation (Antikainen et 
al. 2017), which is not studied in this paper. For the increasing rental prices, housing 
allowance seems not to be the one to blame. One efficient way to lower prices might 
be to increase housing supply (Antikainen et al. 2017). The current studies leave 
intriguing questions to ask for future research. An interesting topic would be the 
heterogeneity of recipients’ effect on housing allowance in Finland or the effect of the 
general HA reform in 2015. 
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